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". Skepticism But Not Cynicism": Chancellor
Allen's Scrutiny of Special Committees
James C. Freund*
As Chancellor William T. Allen retires from the Delaware Court
of Chancery after 12 productive years as its presiding jurist, I want to
pay special tribute to the beneficial influence he exerted on business
lawyers like myself.
A word of background. In the decade of the eighties, I was
practicing law in the mergers and acquisitions (M&A) area, enmeshed
in the takeover activity that marked those frenetic years. I was not a
litigator, but (like other business lawyers representing clients) was
absorbed by what was happening concurrently in the courthouse-in
particular, the one in Wilmington, Delaware. As I noted at the time,
M&A practice in the 1980s had the following characteristics which,
taken together, created a very unstable lawyering environment:
- The necessity for clients to take actions which had legal conse-
quences in order to accomplish their business and financial
goals-actions which placed a heavy premium on the lawyer's
counseling role.
- The knowledge that each step would likely be scrutinized by
a court while under assault by an implacable, well-financed,
intelligent adversary lawyer, poised to characterize one's every move
in apocalyptic terms as the ultimate depredation.
- The feeling of insecurity rooted in the fact that the "legal"
issues tended to be broad ones, the considerations were highly fact-
sensitive, and the facts were almost never the same in crucial
respects from case to case. It was the edge of the law, with few
"bright-lines" existing for appropriate conduct and new judicial
* James C. Freund was formerly a partner of, and is now of counsel to, the law firm of
Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom, LLP. Mr. Freund wishes to acknowledge the valuable
assistance of Michael Davis, a summer associate of the firm, in the preparation of this Article.
The firm has represented parties in certain of the cases discussed herein. This Article does not
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decisions or regulatory positions being promulgated on a weekly
basis.'
All of this impacted directly on the lawyer's vital predictive
function. The ability to tell a client how something is likely to come
out-which is a large part of what separates the professional from the
layman-furnishes the cornerstone on which considerations of strategy
and approach are based. Those of us who counseled the demanding
M&A clients of that turbulent decade had to live with the ever-present
fear of not going far enough to accomplish our purpose, or conversely,
going so far that we would live to regret it in the courthouse.
What we business lawyers needed was guidance, for which the
prime source was the courts. Unfortunately, given the constant state
of flux during those years, what guidance we received was often as
likely to be puzzling as enlightening.
Chancellor Allen, perhaps more than any other jurist of his day,
seemed to appreciate this constant quandary in which practicing
lawyers found themselves. I like to think that he saw his function as
not only to decide the numerous cases that came before him, but also
to provide practitioners with explicit guidance as to what factors he
considered acceptable and what he found troubling in the situations
that recurred frequently during those years.' He spoke not only to the
litigants, the litigators, and the law professors, but to those of us on the
daily firing line-negotiating the next deal which was almost certain to
be judicially reviewed.
This educational function was not an easy task for the Chancellor.
After all, he wasn't drafting a statute or regulations, or writing a
treatise-he was forced to deal with the cases that came before him,
warts and all. He had the clarity of vision to realize that the world we
inhabited was rarely black-and-white. More frequently, the situations
were fact-specific and untidy, with some factors pointing one way,
some another, and still others swathed in ambiguity. His approach was
to embark on a painstaking journey through those facts, assessing and
weighing each of them in turn. His principal goal, of course, was to
arrive at a measured conclusion and thus be able to render an overall
judgment on the matter, which subsumed all the facts. But, just as
important to us, he also recognized that along the way-by expressing
1. James C. Freund, Mergers and Acquisitions: The Quintessence of Change, 36 CLEV. ST.
L. REV. 495, 497 (1988).
2. See Stephen E. Jenkens, The Once and Future Judge?, THE J. DEL. ST. B. Ass'N,
July/Aug. 1997, at 5 (noting Chancellor Allen's substantial influence on Delaware Corporation
law).
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candid (and often eminently quotable) reactions to the various patterns
he encountered-he could educate practitioners who would be
shepherding the next flock as to what was warranted and what missed
the mark.
I am sure that the Chancellor must have realized that by doing
this he eased our lawyering chores. Anyone who has practiced knows
that when a lawyer is advising his or her client to do something that
the client finds disagreeable (or to refrain from taking some action that
the client wants to take), the advice is much more palatable (and the
lawyer has a greater chance of convincing the client to so act or refrain)
if the lawyer can point to a specific statement on the point by the
Chancellor.
To show the reader how this worked in practice, I've chosen to
focus on one specific area-the use of special committees of the board
of directors in M&A transactions (such as, but not limited to,
management- or parent-initiated buyouts). In doing so, I do not mean
to imply that the Chancellor was the only jurist involved with special
committees; in fact, Vice Chancellors Jacobs,3 Hartnett4 and Berger'
all dealt with special committee issues, as did the Delaware Supreme
Court.6 The Chancellor also passed on the use of special committees
in other contexts, such as in deciding on whether to institute derivative
litigation.7 Nor do I intend to suggest any limitation on the Chancel-
lor's judicial scope. He also dealt with the full range of thorny M&A
issues passing through the Delaware courts (as well as many issues
arising in other corporate8 and noncorporate9 contexts), such as board
3. See Citron v. E.I. Dupont de Nemours & Co., 584 A.2d 490 (Del. 1990).
4. See Aprahamian v. HBO, 531 A.2d 1204 (Del. 1987); American Gen. Corp. v. Texas
Air Corp., CIV. A. Nos. 3890, 8406, 8650, 8805, 1987 WL 6337 (Del. Ch. Feb. 5, 1987)
(Hartnett, V.C.). Vice-Chancellor Hartnett is now a justice of the Delaware Supreme Court.
5. See Iseman v. Liquid Air Corp., CIV. A. Nos. 9694, 9833, 1989 WL 125234 (Del. Ch.
Oct. 23, 1989) (Berger, V.C.); In re KDI Corp. Shareholders Litig., CIV. A. No. 1027, 1988 WL
116448 (Del. Ch. Nov. 1, 1988) (Berger, V.C.).
6. See Mills Acquisition Co. v. MacMillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1280 (Del. 1989)
(containing Justice Moore's characterization of MacMillan's efforts to establish an independent
auction, free from the CEO's influence, as "torpid if not supine"); In re RJR Nabisco, Inc. Share-
holders Litig., 556 A.2d 1070 (Del. 1989) (referring to Mills Acquisition Co., cited supra, for a
discussion commending efforts of properly functioning special committees).
7. See Spiegel v. Buntrock, CIV. A. No. 8936, 1988 WL 124324 (Del. Ch. Nov. 17, 1988)
(charging special committee with task of assessing and reporting on corporate accounting
demanded by shareholders); Thorpe v. CERBCO, Inc., 611 A.2d 5 (Del. 1991); Thorpe v.
CERBCO, Inc., CIV. A. No. 11713, 1995 WL 478954 (Del. Ch. Aug. 9, 1995) (employing
special committee to deal with shareholder derivative litigation).
8. See In re Caremark Int'l, Inc. Derivative Litig., CIV. A. No. 13670, 1996 WL 549894
(Del. Ch. Sept. 25, 1996) (approving proposed settlement of shareholder derivative litigation);
Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651 (Del. 1988) (protecting the integrity of
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determinations that effectively blocked shareholders from tendering
shares to an unfriendly acquirer,"° including the issue of whether and
when the board has a fiduciary duty to redeem a "poison pill,"" and
the validity of the grant of lock-up options during the course of an
acquisition. 12 It has been suggested, in fact, that of all the commer-
cial law judges this century has witnessed, only Learned Hand
produced a body of work which equals that turned out by Chancellor
Allen."3 But our focus will be narrowed to just the Chancellor and
to just this one issue, with the main emphasis on the five key years
from 1986 through 1990.
First, here in brief is the backdrop against which this issue played
out.14 An important tenet of Delaware corporation law is the business
judgment rule, as a result of which courts will not substitute their
judgment for the business judgment of boards of directors, provided
that certain standards have been satisfied.'" When a corporate board
confronts a decision on an issue such as selling the company, one such
prerequisite is that the directors reviewing the transaction be disinter-
ested. 16 When directors stand on both sides of a deal, they cannot be
shareholder franchise).
9. See Haft v. Dart Group Corp., CIV. A. No. 13736, 1994 WL 705194 (Del. Ch. Dec.
8, 1994) (granting equitable relief of specific performance in contract action); Boush v. Hodges,
CIV. A. No. 12916, 1996 WL 652762 (Del. Ch. Nov. 6, 1996) (refusing to impose constructive
trust on estate of decedent to fulfill contractual obligation).
10. See AC Acquisitions Corp. v. Anderson, Clayton & Co., 519 A.2d 103 (Del. 1986).
11. See City Capital Assocs. v. Interco, Inc., 551 A.2d 787 (Del. 1988); TW Services, Inc.
v. SWT Acquisition Corp., CIV. A. Nos. 10427, 10298, 1989 WL 20290 (Del. Ch. March 2,
1989).
12. See Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., CIV. A. No. 8358, 1991 WL 111134 (Del. Ch.
June 24, 1991); Cottle v. Cart, CIV. A. No. 9612, 1988 WL 10415 (Del. Ch. Feb. 9,1988). See
also Dennis J. Block et al., Chancellor Allen, The Business Judgment Rule, and the Shareholders'
Right to Decide, 17 DEL. J. CORP. L. 785, 816 (1992).
13. See Jenkins, supra note 2, at 5 (comparing Chancellor Allen to Learned Hand).
14. There is a host of literature on this general subject. For four articles emphasizing
special committees, see Jesse A. Finkelstein, Independent Committees in Interested Transactions, 12-
FALL DEL. LAW 18 (1994); A. Gilchrist Sparks, III & Alan J. Stone, The Important Role of the
Special Committee Under Delaware Law, 680 PLI/CORP 197 (Feb. 22, 1990); Meredith M. Brown
& Michael W. Blair, Representing a Special Committee of Directors in Connection with a Leveraged
Buy-Out or Restructuring Transaction, 636 PLI/CORP 153 (Apr. 6, 1989).
15. See generally Craig W. Palm & Mark A. Kearney, A Primer on the Basics of Directors'
Duties in Delaware: The Rule of the Game (Part I), 40 VILL. L. REV. 1297, 1300-04 (1995)
(explaining operation and components of Delaware's business judgment rule); Block, supra note
12 (detailing the affect of Chancellor Allen's jurisprudence on Delaware's business judgment rule).
16. See Palm & Kearney, supra note 15, at 1308-13 (explaining effect of interested director
status on directors' decisions); Block, supra note 12, at 793-98 (explaining effects of disinterested-
ness and independence on corporate decisions).
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said to be disinterested.' 7 If they're not, then they must affirmatively
demonstrate the entire fairness of the transaction."8
That was the situation in the Weinberger v. UOP, Inc. case,
involving a cash-out merger of a controlled subsidiary in which a
majority of the subsidiary's board were designees of the parent. 19
The Delaware Supreme Court considered the majority's failure to share
pertinent information they possessed with the subsidiary's outside
directors to be a breach of the fiduciary duty they owed to the
subsidiary.2" The court noted, however, in a footnote that the result
could have been different if the subsidiary had appointed an indepen-
dent negotiating committee of its outside directors to deal with the
parent at arm's length, and suggested that use of such a committee
would be considered strong evidence of fairness.2
In a subsequent decision, where arm's-length negotiations were
conducted through a special committee, the Delaware Supreme Court
deemed this to be "of considerable importance" and suggested that "it
may give rise to the proposition that the directors' actions are more
appropriately measured by business judgment standards."22 If so, this
would be quite significant, since as a practical matter, in many cases
the presumption afforded by the business judgment rule represents the
crucial consideration for the court in deciding whether to validate or
overturn the corporate action taken.23
As a result, special committees came into vogue in the 1980s when
conflicts existed, especially in management-led buyouts and where the
minority shareholders of a controlled subsidiary were being squeezed
out. The crucial question in those years was whether the court was
satisfied that the formation and performance of the special committee
was such that its actions were entitled to the benefits of the business
17. See Palm & Kearney, supra note 15, at 1309 (explaining Delaware's definition of
interested director).
18. See Palm & Kearney, supra note 15, at 1349-50 (explaining shifting burden of proof and
applicability of entire fairness standard under Delaware business judgment rule).
19. 457 A.2d 701, 704-8 (Del. 1983).
20. Id. at 703, 711-12.
21. Id. at 709-10 n.7.
22. Rosenblatt v. Getty Oil Co., 493 A.2d 929, 937-938 (Del. 1985).
23. Compare Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp., 535 A.2d 1334, 1341 (Del. 1987)
(upholding board action and explaining that absent self-interest, actions of board conducting
corporate auction are protected by business judgment rule), with MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings
Inc. v. Revlon, Inc., 501 A.2d 1239 (Del. 1985) (voiding actions taken by directors approving
lock-up arrangement, explaining that board's actions were not protected by business judgment
rule). See also AC Acquisitions Corp., 519 A.2d at 111 ("[The] effect of the proper invocation of
the business judgment rule is so powerful [that it] ... frequently is determinative of the outcome
of derivative litigation").
1998]
Seattle University Law Review
judgment rule.24 (Subsequent to this period, as we shall see, the
Delaware Supreme Court ruled that the special committee's sole effect
would be to shift the burden of proof on fairness from the defendant
to the plaintiff.2 ) And this is where Chancellor Allen and the
Delaware Chancery Court came into the picture-to scrutinize
particular transactions and lay down guidelines for practitioners.
At the outset, the Chancellor appeared to approach the subject a
bit gingerly. In a case involving MGM Grand Hotels26 in 1986,
where no special committee participated in the key decision of how to
apportion consideration received in the merger between the majority
and minority stockholders, the Chancellor drily remarked that while
having such a committee might typically constitute one of the "indicia
of fairness," its absence "does not itself establish any breach of duty,"
and what's more "does not itself affect my assessment of [the]
plaintiffs probability of success. "27
Then, in a case decided the next year28 involving the combina-
tion of two companies controlled by the same individual, the Chancel-
lor seemed impressed to find that there was a negotiating committee
composed of two outside directors whose terms in office predated the
controlling shareholder's appearance, who were experienced in
evaluating mergers, and who were advised by independent experts.29
He saw no basis to suspect that those directors were not negotiating
"in a fully independent and duly aggressive way,"' and observed that"the apparent independence of the negotiating committee goes a long
way in weakening"31 the plaintiffs claims about the fairness of the
procedure employed. In the years to come, as we will see, the
Chancellor would prove to be a lot less deferential to appearances.
Later in 1987, the Chancellor upheld the action of a special
committee-"appropriately constituted, well advised and active" in
attempting to maximize public shareholder values-in rejecting one
24. See generally Sparks and Stone, supra note 14 (explaining proper structure and
functioning of effective special committees).
25. For a discussion of the Delaware Supreme Court's treatment of special committees, see
notes 92-3 infra and accompanying text.
26. Jedwab v. MGM Grand Hotels, Inc., 509 A.2d 584 (Del. 1986).
27. Id. at 599-600.
28. In re Maxxam Group, Inc. Stockholders Litig., CIV. A. No. 8636, 1987 WL 10016
(Del. Ch. Apr. 16, 1987).
29. Id. at *3.
30. Id. at *8.
31. Id. at *9.
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suitor's proposal.32 The committee had emphasized risks it saw with
that proposal.33 Chancellor Allen conceded that he had "no special
expertise in making the judgment concerning whether it would be wise
or foolish to incur the risks" that pursuit of the proposal entailed; to
the contrary, the Chancellor noted,
one of the important reasons for the existence of the business
judgment rule is the institutional incompetence of courts to pass
upon the wisdom of business decisions.34
In 1988, however, Chancellor Allen hit his stride with four major
decisions involving special committees-J.P. Stevens,35  Fort
Howard,36 Amsted37 and TWA.3" It should be noted that three of
these cases (.P. Stevens, Fort Howard and TWA) were decisions on
motions to preliminarily enjoin the transaction, where one requisite of
granting the motion is that the court has concluded that the plaintiff
has established a reasonable probability of ultimate success on the
claims asserted.39 In each such case, the Chancellor was limited to
perusing the discovery evidence before him (as contrasted with the evi-
dence and testimony that would be available at a full trial).4" As a
result, the typical (and, to a corporate lawyer's ears, somewhat
convoluted) formulation of his opinion on these issues was that the
plaintiffs' claim is not "sufficiently supported by the evidence at this
time to permit the conclusion that it is reasonably likely that at trial it
would be found" that the claim had been proven.41  Those of us in
the trenches were fully aware that in these M&A cases the granting or
denial of a preliminary injunction was, as they say, the whole ball
game--even though the Chancellor was generally forced (to mix the
metaphor) to deal with less than a full deck.
32. Freedman v. Restaurant Assocs., CIV. A. No. 9212, 1987 WL 14323, at *7 (Del. Ch.
Oct. 16, 1987).
33. Id.
34. Id. at *8.
35. In re J.P. Stevens & Co. Shareholders Litig., 542 A.2d 770 (Del. 1988).
36. In re Fort Howard Corp. Shareholders Litig., CIV. A. No. 9991, 1988 WL 83147 (Del.
Ch. Aug. 8, 1988).
37. In re Amsted Indus. Litig., CIV. A. No. 8224, 1988 WL 92736 (Del. Ch. Aug. 24,
1988) (Allen, C.).
38. In re Trans World Airlines Shareholders Litig., CIV. A. No. 9844, 1988 WL 111271
(Del. Ch. Oct. 21, 1988).
39. See In reJ.P. Stevens, 542 A.2d at 778.
40. See Freedman v. Restaurant Associates Indus. Inc., CIV. A. No. 9212, 1987 WL 14323
(Del. Ch. Oct. 16, 1987) (noting limited factual record available to Chancellor at preliminary
injunction proceedings).
41. In re J.P. Stevens, 542 A.2d at 779.
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In J.P. Stevens, the Chancellor's eye became a little more
jaundiced, although he still ended up at the same ultimate point. My
clue to his transformation was his use of a delicious phrase referring to
the plaintiffs' scorn for a special committee "that vibrates sympatheti-
cally to management's desires. "42 Here the plaintiffs' allegation was
that the special committee had consistently acted to protect the
interests of the company's management by pushing the transaction in
the direction of the bidder that management wanted to see win the
competition, by granting that bidder various contractual rights claimed
to be preferential, and by ultimately making a deal with the favored
bidder at a price lower than what was available elsewhere.43
"Well," said the Chancellor as he appraised the allegations,"maybe that is true; it surely is plausible."" He then proceeded to
list several actions of the committee that he considered suspicious-an
unseemly haste in signing the merger agreement, the grant of a break-
up fee (which arguably wasn't required), and the influence on the
committee of a possibly hollow threat." But when all was said and
done, Chancellor Allen deemed the evidence of bad faith presented to
him as insufficient to support the plaintiffs' plausible story.46 "After
all," he said,
the fact that the Special Committee meets all of the formal or
structural characteristics of a board that is properly functioning-it
is comprised of persons without a financial conflict of interest, it is
well advised and appears diligent in carrying out its mission-means
that something more than the suspicions upon which [the plaintiffs']
plausible account is based is necessary to conclude that bad faith is
likely to be found here.47
Those of us on the firing line were not about to overlook the
significance of the Chancellor's suspicions, however. We heard what
he was telling us: slow down when haste might imply favoritism; go
easy on break-up fees when the leverage to demand them is not there;
do not make flagrant threats to withdraw an offer that is not accepted
immediately.
Now the Chancellor had the bit in his teeth, probing much more




45. Id. at 779-80
46. Id. at 780.
47. Id.
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commenting pointedly on what he saw along the way. In two
subsequent 1988 decisions (even though the Chancellor ultimately
upheld the appropriateness of the special committee action), his
words-to reverse the age-old axiom--spoke louder than his actions.
The first of these two decisions was the Fort Howard case, which
involved a management-affiliated leveraged buyout of public sharehold-
ers.4 In passing on the bona fides of the special committee that acted
for the board in negotiating and approving the deal, Chancellor Allen
noted that direct evidence of bad faith is rarely available.49 Accord-
ingly, one has to look to the inferences drawn from decisions made or
actions taken by the committee."0 This, he said, "requires the court
• * * to be suspicious, to exercise such powers as it may possess to look
imaginatively beneath the surface of events, which, in most instances,
will itself be well-crafted and unobjectionable.""1
This was the eye-opener for me-the Chancellor letting us know
that he felt the need to be suspicious. At this point, I began in earnest
to let my clients know what lay in store for them in court. Especially,
when the Chancellor, looking at the facts of the case before him,
observed darkly that here were "aspects that supply a suspicious mind
with fuel to feed its flame."52 That became my favorite metaphor in
counseling clients: "don't do it," I would say; "this only adds more
fuel to feed the flame."
As "fuel" in that case, the Chancellor cited the fact that the CEO
of Fort Howard, who was leading the leveraged buyout, chose an old
school friend as chairman of the committee and then selected the other
members in conjunction with that friend. 3 Remarked the Chancellor:
"It cannot ... be the best practice to have the interested CEO in effect
handpick the members of the Special Committee."54 The CEO also
chose special counsel for the committee, which elicited this judicial
reaction that we all took very much to heart:
It is obvious that no role is more critical with respect to protection
of shareholder interests in these matters than that of the expert
lawyers who guide sometimes inexperienced directors through the
process. A suspicious mind is made uneasy contemplating the
48. In re Fort Howard, 1988 WL 83147, at *2.
49. Id. at *8.
50. Id.
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possibilities when the interested CEO is so active in choosing his
adversary."5
He was also bothered by a failure of the Special Committee to make
prompt public disclosure of the proposal received from manage-
ment--disclosure which management opposed since it might have led
to a bidding war-on the basis that this "implies a bias ... that is a
source of concern to a suspicious mind."56
In the end, the Chancellor nevertheless upheld the transaction,
because he believed that the special committee had effectively probed
the market for alternative transactions, had not hobbled that market
check with lock-ups and fees, and had responded quickly to the
inquiries it received and provided full information promptly.5 7 But
what stuck in my mind was "a suspicious mind ... made uneasy"
contemplating nefarious possibilities, as well as the inference drawn
through nondisclosure of "a bias ... that is a source of concern to a
suspicious mind."5 8  In a speech I gave to lawyers on the subject a
short time later, 9 the consistent theme of my advice was not to
supply fuel to feed the flame of the Chancellor's suspicions.
Next came the Amsted ° case, which gave the Chancellor even
more trouble, although he ultimately approved the settlement of class
action lawsuits arising out of the transaction. Here, after a takeover
threat surfaced, the Board formed an ESOP; and the board's indepen-
dent special committee then proceeded to negotiate a deal with the
ESOP (including an increase in price over what the ESOP originally
offered). 62 The Chancellor was bothered by the procedure used in
selling the company, which "affords less confidence than one is entitled
to expect that the available alternatives were fully developed." '63
Here, the special committee had been specifically directed not to
engage in a search for alternative transactions, and instead, right off the
bat, they "chose to rely solely upon the theoretical advice of the





59. Freund, The Special Committee as an Integral Part of the Corporate Decision Making
Process, Address at the Practicing Law Institute 21st Annual Institute on Securities Regulation
New York, N.Y. (Nov. 4, 1989).
60. In re Amsted, 1988 WL 92736.
61. Id. at*16.
62. Id. at *2-*5.
63. Id. at*l.
64. Id. at *7.
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"a pale substitute" for a canvas of the relevant market,65 and then
asked this pointed question:
(W]hy did the independent committee of the board-if it was
motivated in good faith to achieve the best transaction for the
shareholders-not check that opinion by shopping the Company, or
at least negotiating for a period in which it could publicly encourage
any interested party to come forward?66
Needless to say, the issue he thus raised-how much was enough
in order to fulfill the committee's fiduciary obligation-became the
subject of much discussion in boardrooms and lawyers' offices during
subsequent transactions.
Case by case, one could observe the suspicions and adverse
inferences building upon the Chancellor. Later in 1988, it all finally
exploded in the TWA67 case. This was a proposed buyout by the
majority shareholder of the public's minority interest in the compa-
ny.68  The members of the special committee had relied on their
investment banker's efforts to prod the majority holder to raise his bid
to a point where the banker could render a favorable fairness opin-
ion.69 In the Chancellor's view, however, minority shareholders have
no obligation to accept a price simply because it falls within some
range of fair prices.7" The TWA special committee, said the Chan-
cellor,
[d]id not seem to understand that their duty was to strive to
negotiate the highest or best available transaction for the sharehold-
ers whom they undertook to represent.71
Accordingly, the Chancellor concluded that:
[T]he special committee did not supply an acceptable surrogate for
the energetic, informed and aggressive negotiation that one would
reasonably expect from an arm's-length adversary . . . . [T]he
burden-shifting effect will not occur where the special committee did
not adequately understand its function-to aggressively seek to
promote and protect minority interests-or was not adequately
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. In re Trans World Airlines, CIV. A. No. 9844, 1988 WL 111271, at *7 (Del. Ch. Oct.
21, 1988).
68. Id. at *1.
69. Id.
70. Id. at *5.
71. Id. at *4.
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informed about the fair value of the firm and the minority shares in
it.
72
I can remember vividly when the TWA decision came down. At
the time, I was representing the special committee of a subsidiary,
where the parent was intent on merging out the subsidiary's public
shareholders. As with most such situations, the parent was not looking
for an attitude of aggressiveness on the subsidiary's part. But the
TWA opinion really strengthened the backbone of this-and every
other-special committee. If a director had any doubt as to how
forcefully he should be in fulfilling his responsibilities, all the
committee's legal advisor had to do (and which I certainly did) was to
read them the Chancellor's words. As a practical matter, given this
opinion, it is hard to conceive of a situation-short of a truly preemp-
tive offer-where the special committee's lawyer would feel comfort-
able advising the committee to accept management's' initial proposal
without attempting to negotiate for a higher price.73
The Chancellor's outrage did not last too long however, and in the
big case of the next year (1989)--in the course of passing on one of the
most highly publicized M&A transactions of our time-he decided that
RJR Nabisco's special committee deserved high marks. 74  This was
in the face of allegations of bias and lack of care, and notwithstanding
the committee's ultimate decision to accept what appeared to be the
lower of two substantially equivalent bids and to close out the bidding
without another round, much to the chagrin of the losing bidder
(which, in a twist on the usual scenario, was the management-led
group) ."5
RJR Nabisco's committee was formed without input from
management, and made prompt public disclosures, initiated an auction
after receiving management's bid, and was actively involved in the
negotiation process, meeting with all bidders.76 The court found that
it was reasonable for the committee to rely on the advice of its two
financial advisors that the bids were essentially equivalent from a
72. Id. at *7.
73. Just in case anyone missed Chancellor Allen's point in TWA, he reiterated it the next
year--once more finding that a special committee which did no more than pass upon the fairness
of the price possessed too narrow a view of its role to take an otherwise interested transaction out
of the class of cases governed by the entire fairness standard. In re Republic American Corp.
Litig., CIV. A. No. 10112, 1989 WL 31551 (Del. Ch. April 4, 1989) (Allen, C.).
74. In re RJR Nabisco, Inc. Shareholders Litig., CIV. A. No. 10389, 1989 WL 7036, at *22
(Del. Ch. Jan. 31, 1989) (Allen, C.).
75. Id. at *15.
76. Id. at *1.
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financial point of view.77 There was no neglect of duty, "given the
amount of attention the directors lavished upon this important
transaction and the responsible steps they took to be competently
advised concerning alternatives open to them. '"78
The Chancellor's fullest exposition on the subject came the next
year in the First Boston79 case. This was a going private transaction
where the public shareholders of the investment banking firm being
merged with its parent were represented by a special committee of
independent directors.° As in many cases of this type, the committee
was unable to shop the buyout group's proposal with any likely effect,
given the interrelated ownership.8' Moreover, it was forced to rely on
management for information about the business and for the judgment
that failure to complete a transaction would be harmful to the
company. 82
The Chancellor recognized that, as a result, the special committee
could see its options as limited. 3 But, he said, the special committee"retained . . . the critical power: the power to say no."8 4  That
power, and the responsibility it implies, is what gives utility to the
special committee device in such transactions.8" He then elaborated
on the theme, touching on the interrelated issues of fairness and "best
available transaction" in such lucid terms that this portion of his
opinion should be read in its entirety:
The power to say no is a significant power. It is the duty of
directors serving on such a committee to approve only a transaction
that is in the best interests of the public shareholders, to say no to
any transaction that is not fair to those shareholders and is not the
best transaction available. It is not sufficient for such directors to
achieve the best price that a fiduciary will pay if that price is not a
fair price. Nor is it sufficient to get a price that falls within a range
of "fair values" somehow defined, if the fiduciary (or another) would
pay more. The fiduciary's best price may not be fair and a
77. Id. at 16.
78. Id. at *18. The Chancellor reached a similar conclusion regarding a special committee
the next year in Roberts v. General Instrument Corp., CIV. A. No. 11639, 1990 WL 118356 (Del.
Ch. Aug. 13, 1990) (Allen, C.), which was significant because it validated a post-agreement
market check procedure, building on the Fort Howard opinion.
79. In re First Boston Inc. Shareholders Litig., CIV. A. No. 10338, 1990 WL 78836 (Del.
Ch. June 7, 1990) (Allen, C.).
80. Id. at *1.
81. Id. at *2.
82. Id. at *4.
83. Id.
84. Id. at *7.
85. Id.
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fiduciaries' [sic] position may preclude the emerge of alternative
transactions at a higher price. The only leverage that a special
committee may have where a fiduciary's position precludes alterna-
tives (such as here or where a controlling shareholder owns a
majority of voting power) is the power to say no and, thus, to force
the fiduciary to choose among the options of implementing a frank
self-dealing transaction at a price that knowledgeable directors have
disapproved, to improve the terms of a transaction or abandon the
transaction. 6
It is, he continued, only when independent directors understand
their mission "to say no unless they conclude that they have achieved
a fair transaction that is the best transaction available," and only"where they pursue that goal independently, in good faith and
diligently," that their decision "deserves the respect accorded by the
business judgment rule." 7  And as a final note-just in case we
didn't get it-he reminded us that appearances are not conclusive. 8
The power to say no. The Chancellor had taken this sometimes
complex area and boiled it down to its essence, while sending a forceful
message to those serving on or advising special committees of directors
charged with protecting the best interests of public shareholders. It
was the last link in the chain of significant guidance that he furnished
the bar in his numerous opinions on the subject. He shaped our views
as to the composition, advice, and function of the special committee.
And this, notwithstanding the fact that in the majority of cases, the
Chancellor ended up either denying the plaintiffs' motions for a
temporary injunction or otherwise validating the transactions. 9
As influential as Chancellor Allen was, however, his views were
not always upheld by the Delaware Supreme Court, in this area as well
as others.90 In the years subsequent to those we have examined, the
supreme court rejected the Chancellor's view that even where there was
a controlling shareholder, the case could be afforded a business
judgment type of judicial review through proper use of an independent
86. Id.
87. Id. at *8.
88. Id.
89. See Karen Donovan, End of an Era Nears for Delaware Courts, NAT'L L.J., Dec. 23,
1996, at Al (chronicling Chancellor Allen's key opinions).
90. See Kahn v. Tremont, Corp., CIV. A. No. 12339, 1996 WL 145452 (Del. Ch. Mar.
21, revised Mar. 27, 1996) (Allen, C.), rev'd, 694 A.2d 422 (Del. 1997) (reversing Chancellor
Allen in special committee case); Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., CIV. A. Nos. 7129, 8358,
1987 WL 4768 (Del. Ch. Jan. 13, revised Jan. 20, 1987) (Allen, C.), rev'd, 542 A.2d 1182 (Del.
1988) (reversing Chancellor Allen).
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effective special committee.91 The substantive legal standard in these
cases, according to the supreme court, remains one of fairness; and a
well-functioning special committee of disinterested directors will only
have the effect of shifting the burden of proof on fairness from the
defendant to the plaintiff. 2
Then, in 1997 the Delaware Supreme Court pointedly disagreed
with the Chancellor as to whether the burden of proof should shift
under the facts of the particular case. 3 This may be where the
Chancellor's willingness to concede that he was bothered by certain
facts (although ultimately supporting the committee's action) finally got
him in trouble.9 4 He expressed his concern over the fact that the
independent director most closely connected to management was the
one who took a leading role in the committee's deliberations.95  He
was openly troubled about the selection of professional advi-
sors-lawyers recommended by company counsel and a financial
advisor which had done prior business with entities related to the
controlling shareholder." Nonetheless, because the process appeared
"informed, active and loyal to the interests" of the company, he
overrode his reservations and shifted the burden of proving fairness to
the plaintiff.97 The Supreme Court, referring at length to the very
reservations expressed by the Chancellor, concluded that his ultimate
determination was not supported by the record.9 Speaking personal-
ly, I wouldn't have needed the formality of the Supreme Court reversal
to steer clear of those troublesome fact patterns in future advisory
situations-the Chancellor's having singled them out as matters of
concern had always been enough for me.
91. Kahn v. Tremont Corp., CIV. A. No. 12339, 1996 \VL 145452 (Del. Ch. March 21,
revised March 27, 1996) (Allen, C.), rev'd, 694 A.2d 422 (Del. 1997).
92. Kahn v. Lynch Communication Sys., 638 A.2d 1110 (Del. 1994).
93. Kahn v. Tremont Corp., 694 A.2d at 428.
94. Id.; Kahn v. Tremont Corp., CIV. A. No. 12339, 1996 WL 145452 (Del. Ch. March
21, revised March 27, 1996) (Allen, C.) (explaining Chancellor Allen's reservations regarding
effectiveness of Tremont's special committee).
95. Kahn v. Tremont Corp., 1996 WL 145452, at *8.
96. Id.
97. Id. at *8.
98. Two of the five judges dissented in a brief opinion by Justice Berger. "The majority's
thorough and well reasoned decision reverses the trial court's equally thorough and well reasoned
decision." The issue here, Justice Berger noted, wasn't legal analysis but evaluation of certain
facts. The trial court recognized the issues "and was satisfied, after six days of trial, that the
Special Committee members were 'informed, active and loyal to the interests of Tremont.' That
finding is supported by the record and should be accorded deference." Tremont Corp., 694 A.2d
at 434 (Berger, J., dissenting).
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In January 1990, Chancellor Allen gave an address on this subject
to practicing lawyers, which provides some interesting insights into his
thinking.99 First, he posed what he considered the crucial question
in deciding whether courts should afford respect to the special commit-
tees: can outside directors be expected to exercise independent
judgment on matters (such as a management-affiliated leveraged
buyout) in which the corporation's CEO has a conflicting interest?1
There is, he said, a dichotomy of views on this.' One school of
thought is that directors are largely ornamental, rubber-stamping
management to mollify outside stockholders.' °2 At the other ex-
treme, however, is the emphasis in the recent development of corporate
law on bringing more outside directors onto boards and the creation of
significant outside director committees (such as those overseeing audits,
compensation, and nomination of directors).10 3
Although the Chancellor recognized that cases like TWA might
support the cynical view of director conduct, he flatly disagreed.1°4
"I remain unconvinced," he said. 50' "I confess to skepticism but not
cynicism."10 6 Citing cases such as RJR Nabisco, he concluded that it
is possible for outside directors to function independently (while noting
that not every decision by a special committee deserves such respect)
and characterized the distinction as follows:
The factor that .distinguishes those circumstances in which the
decision of a committee of outside directors has been accorded
respect and those in which its decision has not, is not mysterious.
The court's own implicit evaluation of the integrity of the special
committee's process marks that process as deserving respect or
condemns it to be ignored. When a special committee's process is
perceived as reflecting a good faith, informed attempt to approxi-
mate aggressive, arm's-length bargaining, it will be accorded
substantial importance by the court. When, on the other hand, it
appears as artifice, ruse or charade, or when the board unduly limits
the committee or when the committee fails to correctly perceive its
99. William T. Allen, Independent Directors in MBO Transactions: Are They Fact or
Fantasy?, 45 Bus. LAW 2055 (1990). Chancellor Allen delivered this address at the University
of California San Diego's 17th Annual Securities Regulation seminar. It was reprinted in a
slightly revised form.
100. Id. at 2055-56 (questioning whether "special committees of outside directors ... can
or do function adequately to protect appropriate interests" when the corporation is being sold).
101. Id. at 2056.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 2056-59.
105. Id. at 2059.
106. Id.
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mission-then one can expect that its decision will be accorded no
respect. 07
The Chancellor well understood the pressures on directors and
could see that some committees appear "as no more than, in T.S.
Eliot's phrase, 'an easy tool, deferential, glad to be of use.""'1 8 But
the factor that stands against the pressures toward accommodation with
the CEO is a sense of duty on the part of directors-a realization that
they "stand in a new and different relationship to the firm's manage-
ment or its controlling shareholder. "'09 When a special committee
performs its assignment badly, "it is probably because its members
have been ill-served by their advisors and, as a result, have failed to
understand or to accept the radical change in that relationship that had
occurred."" 0
This led the Chancellor to comment on one of his favorite
subjects-the lawyers on whom the often inexperienced committee
members rely-and to the crucial role counsel must play in establishing
the trustworthiness of the process."'
[I]n my opinion, if the special committee process is to have
integrity, it falls in the first instance to the lawyers to unwrap the
bindings that have joined the directors into a single board; to instill
in the committee a clear understanding of the radically altered state
in which it finds itself and to lead the committee to a full under-
standing of its new duty."2
This means that lawyers have "to implement the substance of an
arm's-length process."' 3 Their client is the committee, so they must
be independent of management, holding the CEO and his associates at
arm's-length-a posture which, he recognized, may mean that the
lawyers have to be prepared to forego future business."14 If the
process is to "offer to shareholders protections that are consistent with
justice, it will in large measure be because lawyers have been true to
their professional responsibilities and have used their talent and power
to see that outside directors understand and strive to satisfy their
107. Id. at 2060.
108. Id. at 2061 (quoting T.S. Eliot, The Love Song of J. Alfred Prufrock, in COLLECTED
POEMS 1909-1962 (Harcourt, Brace & World 1970).
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 2061-62.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 2062.
114. Id.
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duty.""'  This is a "special role" we lawyers have to play, said the
Chancellor, reminding us finally that we were "not engaged in a
strictly commercial enterprise" but rather "have accepted an obligation
... to .. .the pursuit of systematic justice.""' 6
I never appeared before Chancellor Allen (although a number of
my partners did), but all through those years-and especially when I
was representing a special committee-I could hear him talking to me
and my colleagues. Amid the legalistic parlance addressing the
procedural niceties of chancery court, what the Chancellor really
wanted us to absorb came through to the practitioners, loud and
clear-and occasionally in colorful terms and memorable metaphors.
Suspicious minds made uneasy; fuel to feed flames; committees vibrating
sympathetically; pale substitutes; directors who don't understand their
duty; the power to say 'no'. We may not always have agreed with him,
but is it any wonder we listened so closely?" 7
The able lawyers who practiced in the M&A area during those
turbulent times implicitly understood the special role they occupied, as
they looked to the Chancellor for leadership. The guidance he
furnished, in this and numerous other areas, has done much to raise
standards of acceptable conduct to new and improved heights-all of
which should stand as a monument to the intelligence, depth, and
integrity of Chancellor Allen.
115. Id. at 2063.
116. Id.
117. As an example of one of the Chancellor's observations with which I did not agree, he
was bothered in the Fort Howard case, discussed supra, by a meeting of the investment bankers
for the two sides which took place at a point before the banker for the special committee had
arrived at a preliminary view on fair value. I expressed the view at the time (in the speech cited
supra at note 60) that, as a practical matter, it was often important for the investment advisors to
have a preliminary exchange of views on valuation, as well as to make sure they were relying on
the same financial information and relevant factors. Moreover, having personally witnessed the
kind of blatant posturing that goes on between investment bankers at such affairs, I didn't see
how any whiff of bias could be inferred from the mere fact that they had held a meeting.
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